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Communication, Renegotiation,  
and the Scope for Collusion†
By David J. Cooper and Kai-Uwe Kühn*
We study the effect of communication in an experimental game where 
cooperation is consistent with equilibrium play if players share 
an understanding that cheating will be punished. Consistent with 
communication acting as a coordinating device, credible preplay 
threats to punish cheating are the most effective message to facilitate 
collusion. Promises to collude also improve cooperation. Credible 
threats do not occur in a treatment with a limited message space 
that permits threats of punishment. Contrary to some theoretical 
predictions, renegotiation possibilities facilitate collusion. (JEL 
C71, C73, D83, L12)
The Finns will respect the Spanish dominance in Spain if ENCE really 
increase their prices in other countries: If Finncell learn about prices 
below US $360 also in the future, they will reconsider their policy as to 
sales in Spain!
— European Commission, 1985
The preceding quote is from a document found in the European Woodpulp case (Decision 85/202/EEC, 1985, published in OJ L85/1). Finncell, the joint sales 
organization for Finnish producers, promises to abide by a collusive agreement if 
ENCE, the leading Spanish producer of wood pulp, does so as well, but threatens 
to punish ENCE in the future if it departs from the agreement. Communications 
containing explicit threats and promises of this sort are understood to be at the heart 
of illegal cartel activities. The per se prohibitions on price fixing under the Sherman 
Act in the United States and Article 101 of the Treaty of Rome in the European 
Union are effectively prohibitions on such conversations, and enforcement focuses 
on discovering evidence of communication and explicit agreements. Despite this 
emphasis by antitrust authorities, incriminating communication commonly occurs 
within cartels, as is well-documented in case and field evidence (e.g., Genesove and 
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Mullin 2001). The frequency of interfirm communication about collusion in the 
face of large fines  suggests that it must be a valuable tool for establishing collusive 
outcomes. However, it is not well understood why this is the case and what needs to 
be said to make collusion successful.
Price collusion between firms is just one example where repeated interaction 
makes cooperation consistent with equilibrium play, even though agents have incen-
tives to behave noncooperatively in the short run. A common element across such 
cases is that cooperation can be enforced in equilibrium by the threat to switch from 
cooperative behavior to noncooperative behavior after a deviation is observed. We 
frame our discussion in terms of price collusion, but our insights about the role of 
communication in improving cooperation are applicable to other cases where coop-
erative equilibria have this structure. This includes examples where cooperation is 
socially desirable, such as implicit contracting, team production, and the provision 
of local public goods.
This intuition has been formalized in the theory of infinitely repeated games 
(Abreu 1988; Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1990). The theory does not model 
communication, but implies that collusion relies on firms solving a coordination 
problem: cooperation can only be supported if players know that deviations will be 
punished by switching from a high-payoff to a low-payoff continuation equilibrium. 
The literature typically assumes that coordination on the necessary contingent strat-
egies is easily achieved. However, experimental evidence from related coordination 
games shows that subjects often fail to reach a Pareto optimal equilibrium in the 
absence of an explicit coordination device (Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1990). 
Communication dramatically increases the likelihood of coordination on an efficient 
equilibrium (Cooper et al. 1992; Blume and Ortmann 2007; Brandts and Cooper 
2007). Coordination on a collusive equilibrium is far more complex, requiring 
agreements not just on a single action but on entire contingent plans. It is not obvi-
ous that communication can be as effective a coordination device in such settings.
At the same time experimental evidence suggests that communication may have 
a role beyond coordination, since it can lead to more cooperative outcomes in one-
shot (or finitely repeated) games where cooperation is not an equilibrium outcome 
(e.g., Dawes, MacTavish, and Shaklee 1977; Isaac and Walker 1988; Cason and Mui 
2009; Charness and Dufwenberg 2006). There are many explanations why com-
munication makes subjects more willing to cooperate in the absence of monetary 
incentives, including increased group identity, aversion to lying (or guilt aversion, 
which is slightly different),1 and improved understanding of the mutual benefits of 
cooperation. If communication primarily improves collusion through such channels, 
the mechanism of rewards and punishment in the continuation game may be unnec-
essary to sustain cooperative outcomes. Such a finding would reduce the practical 
relevance of the theory of repeated games which explains cooperation as an equilib-
rium phenomenon that relies on this mechanism.
1 These concepts are closely related to results from the psychology literature finding that communication allows 
players to make promises which are binding due to strong norms, both internal and social, against violating com-
mitments (Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland 1994).
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We explore these different explanations for how communication might foster col-
lusion through a series of experiments that vary the type of communication available. 
Subjects play a sequence of two-period collusion games with random rematching 
between games. Collusion (mutual choice of a high price) can be supported in the 
first period as part of a subgame perfect equilibrium, but only if deviations are pun-
ished by play of a Pareto inferior equilibrium in the second period. The two-period 
collusion game therefore captures the main strategic features of infinitely repeated 
collusion games while avoiding a number of methodological problems occurring for 
experiments on communication in indefinitely repeated games.
In an initial phase without communication, first-period play quickly collapses 
to the noncooperative equilibrium.2 Communication is then added for the second 
phase of the experiment. If communication is limited to pregame statements of 
intent to collude in Period 1 with no possibility of specifying a punishment scheme 
for deviations, an initial increase in collusion is followed by a collapse back to the 
noncooperative equilibrium. This is in line with results reported by Holt and Davis 
(1990). Adding the possibility of specifying a punishment scheme without other-
wise expanding the message space does not improve matters, as play still collapses 
back to the noncooperative equilibrium. When a rich pregame message space is 
used—subjects have access to a chat window and can send and receive unlimited 
messages—there is again an initial burst of collusive behavior followed by grad-
ual deterioration. Unlike the treatments with limited message spaces, this decline 
slows and is eventually reversed in the pregame chat treatment. By the end of the 
experiment, collusive behavior returns to its initial high levels. When renegotiation 
is allowed by adding chat between periods of the game, collusion is even more 
common and never exhibits a decline. This contradicts the unambiguous theoretical 
prediction for the game we implement: renegotiation should eliminate all collusion 
by making it impossible to credibly commit to punish cheating.
Detailed analysis of the chat content identifies two channels by which commu-
nication leads to persistent collusion in the treatment with preplay chat: credible 
threats and promises. Subjects who either send or receive credible threats (i.e., a 
threat of punishment that, if believed, makes it incentive compatible to abide by a 
collusive agreement) that noncollusive play will be punished are significantly less 
likely to cheat on collusive agreements. The effect is large. Sending a credible threat 
is estimated to lower the probability of cheating by 40 percent and receiving a cred-
ible threat lowers the probability of cheating by 26 percent. Credible threats are by 
far the most effective type of communication for bolstering collusion in the treat-
ment with preplay communication. Underlying the effectiveness of credible threats 
are changes in the incentive to collude: Generally we observe higher payoffs for 
cheating on a collusive agreement than complying with it, but this reverses when a 
credible threat is sent or received.
The powerful effect of credible threats supports the role of communication as a 
coordination device to achieve a collusive equilibrium consistent with the standard 
2 The payoffs in our game are designed to make it likely that collusion will fail in the absence of communica-
tion, but this is not a universal feature of collusion games. Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) study which features of the 
payoff table make collusion likely.
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theory. If collusion was observed but such punishment was rarely mentioned or if it 
played a smaller role in fostering collusion than other types of communication, this 
would have been a cause for skepticism about the theory itself. Our result comple-
ments earlier experimental work on collusion by Dal Bó (2005) which demonstrated 
that collusive play is more likely when players operate “under the shadow of the 
future.” We show that the “shadow of the future” becomes much more important 
when explicit threats of punishment can be made.
Given the importance of credible threats in the preplay chat treatment, it is sur-
prising that collusion is so low in the treatment with a limited message space that 
allows for threats of punishment. The messages sent in this treatment indicate that 
the problem is not a failure to threaten punishment, but instead a failure to specify 
sufficiently harsh punishments for cheating to be unprofitable. Limited message 
treatments are therefore not a good substitute for more natural conversations that 
take place with open chat. Limited message treatments may miss the types of mes-
sages that actually matter and the available messages are used differently than they 
would be in a natural conversation.
The second channel through which communication boosts collusion in the treat-
ment with preplay chat is promises of trustworthy behavior. Sending promises of 
trustworthy behavior is associated with a significant decrease in cheating by the 
sender on collusive agreements. The marginal effect is less than half of the effect of 
sending a credible threat, reducing cheating by 19 percent. On the surface this lines 
up with the results of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), as well as the psychol-
ogy literature (see Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland 1994, for a summary) finding that 
promises increase cooperation. However, in our setting neither an aversion to lying 
nor guilt aversion is necessary to explain the self-commitment effect of promises: 
subjects who send explicit promises face sufficiently strong punishment for cheating 
that collusion becomes incentive compatible. Surprisingly, this self-commitment is 
not valuable to the subject sending the promise since it does not reduce cheating by 
the individual receiving the promise.
In the treatment allowing for renegotiation, the second-period chat provides a 
clear explanation why collusion is more successful than in any other treatment. 
Consistent with renegotiation theory, players try to avoid administering a punish-
ment following cheating and these attempts have some success. As a result, average 
monetary punishments after deviations from collusive agreements are the weakest 
of all communication treatments. However, this is counteracted by a second impor-
tant effect of allowing chat between the two periods of the game: individuals who 
are cheated can reproach those who cheated them. They seize upon this opportunity 
with high frequency and great enthusiasm. The availability of an inexpensive and 
effective form of punishment in the treatment with renegotiation provides a good 
explanation for the high and stable levels of collusion achieved in this treatment.3
3 This is similar to the effect of nonpecuniary punishments (disapproval points) in public goods games (Masclet 
et al. 2003). The effect here is more persistent, possibly due to the richer set of verbal punishments available. 
Likewise, Xiao and Houser (2005) find that the possibility of verbal punishment reduces rejection rates in ultima-
tum games.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section I we discuss collusion theory and 
the theory of communication in games. Section II describes the experimental design 
in detail. In Section III we present the experimental results. We first analyze the 
benchmark behavior when there is no communication possible and then look at the 
short and long run treatment effects of various communication treatments. We then 
go into more detail on the content analysis of the preplay chat treatment and the 
renegotiation treatment. Section IV concludes the paper and discusses the relation-
ship between our work and field studies of communication and collusion.
I. Communication and the Theory of Collusion
The standard theoretical approach to price collusion is quite simple conceptu-
ally: collusion can be supported at a price greater than the competitive price if the 
short-run gain from undercutting is less than the long run losses induced by future 
punishment involving a switch from collusive to competitive behavior. What is criti-
cal for the argument is that both the promise of future collusion as a reward for past 
collusive behavior and the threat of future competitive behavior as a punishment for 
a past deviation are credible in the sense that they involve equilibrium play. A cred-
ible threat therefore requires a coordinated switch between different equilibria of 
the continuation game. A central question in our study is how communication helps 
players coordinate on the contingent play necessary for a collusive equilibrium. This 
section develops predictions on what kind of communication we should observe if 
cheap talk can be used as a coordination device in collusion games.
To fix ideas we discuss the specific two-period game employed in our experi-
ments. The following two matrices show the row player’s payoffs for Period 1 and 
Period 2, respectively. The payoff structure is symmetric, and the row player’s pay-
off for actions (i, j) equal the column player’s payoffs for action ( j, i). 
Period 1 Period 2
Low Medium High Low Medium High
Low 15 54 54 Low 30 56 56
Medium −24 45 114 Medium 4 90 96
High −24 −24 60 High 4 4 120
The Period 1 stage game can be interpreted as a standard Bertrand game in which 
firms have a choice between three possible prices and have a sunk cost of 24. The 
unique Nash equilibrium of the Period 1 stage game played in isolation is (L, L). 
The Period 2 stage game is derived from the continuation profits of an infinitely 
repeated version of the Period 1 stage game with discounting, as described in online 
Appendix C. This results in a coordination game in which there are three pure strat-
egy equilibria, (L, L), (M, M), and (H, H). These equilibria are Pareto ranked with 
(H, H) being the Pareto dominant equilibrium.
We refer to the full two-period game as the Two-Period Bertrand Game (TPBG). 
The necessary incentive conditions are satisfied so that (L, L), (M, M), or (H, H) 
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can all be sustained in the first period of a subgame perfect equilibrium if play-
ers play (L, L) in Period 2 after any deviation in Period 1 and (H, H) otherwise. 
Asymmetric Period 1 outcomes (H, L) and (M, L) (and their permutations) can 
also be sustained in this way but not (H, M).4 All collusive equilibria of the TPBG, 
defined as equilibria that yield an outcome other than (L, L) for Period 1, require 
that players use the first-period outcome as a coordination device for play in the 
second period. This captures the essential structure of all theories of collusion based 
on infinitely repeated games (Abreu 1988; Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1990) or 
finitely repeated games (Benoit and Krishna 1985).
For preplay communication to have a systematic impact on outcomes, players 
must take messages to have meaning. But players cannot believe just any message 
because opponents may have an incentive to lie in order to induce favorable behav-
ior. We assume that two features of communication are necessary for credible com-
munication. First, a message is credible if each player has an incentive to do what 
he proposes as long as he expects the proposal to be believed by the other player.5 
Second, a pair of proposals from two different players should be considered cred-
ible only if the proposals are compatible. These two conditions are equivalent to 
requiring agreement on a Nash equilibrium of the game. Since all Nash equilibria in 
the TPBG that support Period 1 prices above L involve contingent play in Period 2 
(i.e., play in Period 2 varies depending on the Period 1 outcome), these assumptions 
about credibility predict that communication can facilitate collusion only if mes-
sages specifying contingent strategies are available and used. Going further, only 
messages that threaten to punish cheating with play of Low in Period 2 provide 
credible support for a proposal to play (H, H) in Period 1.
If communication is used as a coordination device prior to Period 1, we should also 
expect subjects to go further and coordinate on an equilibrium whenever they can 
communicate. This raises the issue of renegotiation prior to Period 2. Renegotiation 
theory is built on the assumption that players will use an unspecified coordination 
device to achieve a Pareto undominated continuation equilibrium after any history 
of play.6 Suppose players in the TPBG can communicate and hence coordinate 
before both periods. Since continuation equilibria in the TPBG are Pareto ranked, 
the intuition underlying renegotiation theory implies players will agree on and play 
(H, H) in Period 2 regardless of the Period 1 outcome. Messages prior to Period 1 
that specify a different equilibrium for Period 2 should therefore be ignored because 
rational individuals will anticipate the impact of renegotiation prior to Period 2. It 
4 Note that (H, H) can only be sustained in Period 1 if (L, L) is played in Period 2 after a deviation and (H, H) 
otherwise. All other Period 1 subgame perfect equilibria can also be sustained by playing (L, L) after a deviation 
and (M, M) otherwise in Period 2. The only Period 1 outcome that can be sustained by playing (M, M) after a devia-
tion and (H, H) otherwise is (M, M) in Period 1.
5 This condition corresponds to the concept of “self-commitment” in Aumann (1990). Aumann also requires that 
messages are “self-signaling”: the sender only wants the message to be believed if he is telling the truth. This condi-
tion is much more controversial. As Farrell and Rabin (1996) point out, this condition leads to unlikely predictions 
about the effectiveness of communication in stag-hunt games and cannot be satisfied in collusion games.
6 See Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987); Bernheim and Ray (1989); and Benoît and Krishna (1993) for 
finitely repeated games and van Damme (1989); Farrell and Maskin (1989); and Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 
(1993) for supergames. The assumption that a Pareto undominated equilibrium will be chosen is not generally 
accepted in the cheap talk literature for cases, unlike the TPBG, where equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked since 
there is a conflict of interest in these cases (Farrell and Rabin 1996).
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follows that messages prior to Period 1 cannot credibly specify a contingent strategy 
for Period 2. No collusion should therefore occur in Period 1 of the TPBG if we 
allow for communication as a coordination device between Period 1 and Period 2 
play.
It is not a universal property of collusion games that allowing renegotiation elimi-
nates the possibility to collude. This occurs in the TPBG because the equilibria of 
the Period 2 game can be Pareto ranked. The scope for collusion under renegotiation 
is significantly wider when there are multiple asymmetric continuation equilibria 
that cannot be Pareto ranked. The TPBG is designed to make the predicted effect of 
renegotiation as stark as possible, yielding a clean test of the main idea underlying 
all models of renegotiation: the ability to renegotiate will eliminate the use of Pareto 
dominated continuation equilibria and therefore limit the outcomes that can be sup-
ported as equilibria in the full game.
Several other features of the TPBG are designed to make the results easier to 
interpret. The equilibrium (M, M) is risk dominant (Harsanyi and Selten 1988) in 
the second-period game. This makes it relatively likely that M will be chosen in 
the absence of an explicit coordination device. If, in contrast, (H, H) were both 
Pareto and risk dominant, H would be a natural default choice in Period 2. Players 
could then easily coordinate on (H, H) without an explicit coordination device and 
it would be more difficult to identify the effect of communication as a coordination 
device when renegotiation is allowed. Making (M, M) risk dominant also helps to 
identify contingent behavior. Since collusion at (H, H) in Period 1 can only be sup-
ported by a switch from (H, H) to (L, L) in Period 2, more effective communication 
should move Period 2 play away from (M, M) to the extremes. Note that (L, L) in 
Period 2 is unlikely to occur due to coordination failure rather than a conscious deci-
sion to punish cheating because it is both Pareto and Risk dominated.
More generally, the TPBG provides strong incentives in the sense that collusion 
at H is highly beneficial, strong punishments are needed to maintain collusion in 
equilibrium, and the loss from cheating and being punished in equilibrium is large. 
The payoff from play of (H, H) is 33 percent larger in each period than the pay-
off from play of (M, M), collusion at H in Period 1 can only be supported as an 
equilibrium outcome via reversion to (L, L) in Period 2 which reduces payoffs by 
75 percent compared to play of (H, H), and the payoff from colluding at (H, H) in 
both periods is 25 percent greater than the payoff from defection to M in Period 1 
followed by reversion to (L, L) in Period 2 (180 versus 144). Subjects are given 
strong incentives to reach and abide by collusive agreements, but the punishment 
called for by the equilibrium is sufficiently harsh for both players that it is unlikely 
to be undertaken lightly.
II. Experimental Design
A. General Design
Subjects play 20 rounds of the TPBG in all treatments. A “round” refers to an 
entire play of the TPBG while a “period” refers to one of the two games played 
within a single round of the TPBG. Subjects are randomly matched with a new 
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opponent in each round. Sessions are sufficiently large (minimum of 20 subjects) 
that it is unlikely that there are repeated game effects between rounds.
For the first ten rounds in all treatments subjects play the TPBG without any com-
munication. This is sufficient for subjects to understand the experimental interface, 
payoff tables, and main strategic issues in the TPBG before attempting to master 
use of communication. Having ten rounds of play before introducing communica-
tion also allows play to converge to the one shot Nash equilibrium in the first period, 
making the task facing subjects in Rounds 11–20 more challenging. Treatments vary 
by the type of communication available in Rounds 11–20.
B. Use of the TPBG
By using the TPBG our design differs from earlier work on collusion that used 
indefinitely repeated games as proxies for supergames (e.g., Roth and Murnighan 
1978; Dal Bó 2005; Dal Bó and Fréchette 2011; Duffy and Ochs 2009). The 
 simplicity of a two-period game has significant methodological advantages for a 
study that focuses on communication and learning. The most important is speed of 
play and learning. Subjects go through a lengthy learning process, and our conclu-
sions would differ substantially if this process lacked adequate time to converge. 
Generating the requisite experience is nontrivial since chat slows down play sig-
nificantly and we limited ourselves to two hour sessions, including instructions, 
to avoid subject fatigue. The TPBG is sufficiently simple that most sessions were 
completed within two hours, even with chat, and play largely stabilized by the end 
of Round 20. Another advantage provided by the TPBG’s simplicity is that we can 
make sharp theoretical predictions, as described in Section I, about what type of 
proposals for play of (H, H) in Period 1 are credible and what equilibria are rene-
gotiation proof. Finally, using a relatively simple game helps with the statistical 
evaluation of the outcomes. Analyzing the content of messages is a daunting task 
even when the number of types of relevant messages that can be sent is small. If we 
expand the strategy space, and by extension increase the number of relevant mes-
sage types, the analysis quickly becomes intractable.
This is not to say that use of the TPBG as a proxy for a supergame is riskless. Our 
main concern follows from the fact that a collusive equilibrium depends on players’ 
behavior changing in Period 2 based on the outcome of Period 1. This requires sub-
jects to see a connection between the two periods of the TPBG. Because the TPBG 
uses different games for the two periods, it is plausible that subjects will have more 
difficulty seeing the connection between periods than in an indefinitely repeated 
game where the payoff matrix is fixed. However, as documented below, we observe 
no shortage of contingent play in the four treatments with communication, and noth-
ing in the data suggests that a lack of contingent play drives our qualitative results.7
7 See Fréchette and Yuksel (2013) for a comparison of four different methods of implementing supergames in 
the laboratory, including our method and random termination. Levels of Period 1 cooperation are similar across all 
four methods, with our method finishing in the middle of the pack. Unlike our data, they observe relatively little 
contingent play in the final period (i.e., the coordination game). While there are a number of differences between 
the studies, we suspect that the differing results reflect differences in how the payoff tables were constructed for the 
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In a follow-up study, we replicated results from the TPBG with a three period 
version of the game (stage game, stage game discounted, and coordination game). 
If contingent play is suppressed in the TPBG because the relationship between 
Periods 1 and 2 is not obvious to subjects, this should matter less in the three period 
game and cooperation should be higher. Instead, we find that the change to a lon-
ger game has no impact on Period 1 play. This gives us greater confidence that the 
results of our experiment are not sensitive to the number of periods in the game.
C. The Communication Treatments
We compare play in five communication treatments: No Communication, Period 1 
Limited Communication, Period 1 Limited Communication with Contingencies, 
Preplay Chat, and Renegotiation. The following subsection describes each of these 
treatments. Recall that subjects play 20 rounds of the TPBG in all treatments. A 
“round” refers to an entire play of the two-period game while a “period” refers to 
one of the two stage games played within a single round of the TPBG. For the first 
ten rounds in all treatments subjects play the TPBG without any communication, so 
treatments only vary the type of communication that is possible in Rounds 11–20. 
All treatments have a pause following Round 10 while new instructions are read.
 (i) No Communication (N Treatment).—The rules for Rounds 11–20 are identi-
cal to those in Rounds 1–10, with no communication between players. The 
N treatment is included as a control to exclude the possibility that collusion 
in Round 11 is caused by a restart effect. In the pause following Round 10 it 
is announced that the games for Rounds 11–20 will use the same rules as for 
Rounds 1–10.
 (ii) Period 1 Limited Communication (P1 Treatment).—The P1 treatment gives 
subjects the opportunity to send a message prior to the beginning of Period 1. 
The message space is limited to suggesting actions for Period 1. Specifically, 
subjects are given the prompt, “I think we should choose the following in 
Period 1.” They are asked to choose between “Low,” “Medium,” “High,” or 
“No Response” for both “My Choice” and “Your Choice.” Messages are cho-
sen simultaneously and each player is shown both parts of both players’ mes-
sages at the same time as choices are made for Period 1. The feedback at the 
end of Period 1 reiterates the messages as well as reporting the outcome for 
Period 1. Subjects cannot send any messages about their intent for Period 2.
 (iii) Period 1 Limited Communication with Contingencies (P1C Treatment).—
In addition to specifying what actions should be chosen for Period 1, sub-
jects in the P1C treatment also indicate what actions should be chosen for 
Period 2 subject to the outcome for Period 1. The set of possible messages 
about Period 2 is limited: subjects are prompted “[i]f we choose the preceding 
coordination game. Recall that the Period 2 table was constructed with (M, M) as the risk-dominant equilibrium, to 
make it more likely that contingent behavior could be detected.
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[i.e., the actions the subject has specified should be chosen for Period 1] in 
Period 1, I think we should choose the following in Period 2” and “[i]f we DO 
NOT choose the preceding [i.e., the actions the subject has specified should 
be  chosen for Period 1] in Period 1, I think we should choose the following 
in Period 2.” Limiting the message space simplifies the problem facing sub-
jects while still making it possible to send a credible message that supports 
collusion in Period 1. Subjects are shown both players’ messages, in full, at 
the same time as choices are made for Period 1. The messages are displayed 
again as part of the feedback for Period 1.
 (iv) Preplay Chat (PChat Treatment).—At the heart of our experimental design 
are the two chat treatments. Starting in Round 11, the PChat treatment 
allows players to communicate using the chat option in version 3.1 of z-tree 
(Fischbacher 2007). This is very similar to using an IM program. Continuous 
back-and-forth communication is possible until one of the players makes 
a decision for the period. Subjects are given no guidance on how the chat 
should be used or what they might say, although it is fairly obvious that it is 
meant for discussing the game.
 (v) renegotiation (rChat Treatment).—Communication before Period 1 occurs 
in the rChat treatment in exactly the same way as in the PChat treatment. 
The rChat treatment differs from the PChat treatment by also allowing com-
munication through a chat window after first-period actions are observed and 
before second-period actions are chosen, making renegotiation possible.
D. Initial Hypotheses
Our initial hypotheses for Period 1 play are derived from the discussion of com-
munication and collusion in Section I. While it is possible to achieve tacit collusion 
in an experimental collusion game without communication, the TPBG is designed to 
make this unlikely in the N treatment.8 The limited message space available in the P1 
treatment makes it impossible to reach a credible agreement to collude in Period 1. 
We therefore did not expect long term collusion in this treatment. Consistent with 
earlier results of Holt and Davis (1990), we expected an initial increase in collusion 
when communication was introduced since it takes some time to learn whether mes-
sages calling for Period 1 collusion are credible. The P1C treatment allows for cred-
ible agreements to collude, so higher and more stable collusion was expected than 
in the P1 treatment. For the same reason, the PChat treatment was also expected 
to yield higher and more persistent collusion than the P1 treatment. The rich com-
munication available in the PChat treatment provides more scope for behavioral 
factors such as trust and guilt to have an effect, so we anticipated higher and more 
8 Collusion at H is not risk dominant. Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) find that making collusion at H risk dominant 
is necessary but not sufficient to guarantee successful collusion, so we did not expect collusion at H in the absence 
of communication.
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stable collusion in the PChat treatment than in the P1C treatment.9 The intuition 
 underlying theories of renegotiation predicts that allowing chat between Periods 1 
and 2 should undermine collusion in Period 1 and lead to coordination on H in 
Period 2. We therefore expected to see less collusion in the RChat treatment than in 
the PChat treatment.
E. Procedures
The experiments were conducted at Case Western Reserve University using sub-
jects recruited via e-mails sent to all undergraduates. Sessions were run in a com-
puterized laboratory using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), and took between 1 1 _ 2 and 2 
hours. Average earnings were slightly more than $20, including a $6 show-up fee. 
Subjects were paid their total earnings from all 20 rounds of the TPBG. Payoffs 
were denominated in experimental currency units (ECUs), converted to dollars at 
a rate of 130 ECUs equal $1. Table 1 summarizes the number of subjects and ses-
sions for each treatment. There are three sessions for each treatment with at least 20 
subjects per session.
The instructions (see online Appendix E) were read to the subjects, and were 
also shown on the subjects’ computer screens. Several times the payoff tables 
were projected on an overhead screen for examples, making the payoffs common 
knowledge. The matching for this experiment is relatively complex (fixed matching 
within a round, random rematching between rounds), so this point was emphasized. 
Following the instructions, subjects took a quiz testing their ability to read the pay-
off tables and their understanding of the instructions.
The experimental materials are framed using abstract language. For example, 
the materials do not refer to prices. Subjects choose between “A,” “B,” and “C” in 
Period 1 and between “D,” “E,” and “F” in Period 2, with the three labels in each 
period corresponding to low, medium, and high prices. The terms “Low,” “Medium,” 
and “High” (or L, M, and H) are used throughout this paper to ease exposition, but 
these are not the labels seen by subjects.
9 Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) compare rich and limited communication in a one-shot trust game and find 
that rich messages makes subjects more trusting and somewhat more trustworthy. Our game is different because 
cooperation is consistent with equilibrium and messages about contingent strategies have an important role to play. 
As will be seen, our results are both stronger and have a different interpretation. Rather than revolving around 
 differences in what can be said in the two treatments, the P1C and PChat treatments differ in the usage of a com-
mon set of messages.
Table 1—Summary of Treatments
N P1 P1C PChat RChat
Number of sessions  3  3  3  3  3
Number of subjects 64 68 74 64 76
First-period limited messages ✓ ✓
Contingent messages about Period 2 ✓
First-period chat ✓ ✓
First- and second-period chat ✓
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Subjects knew they would be playing a total of 20 rounds of the TPBG. They also 
knew that the first ten rounds would be played without communication and followed 
by a pause for additional instructions. The possibility of communication was intro-
duced at this intermediate point. To maintain parallelism there was a pause prior to 
the 11th round in the N treatment to announce that none of the rules would change.
In the P1 and P1C treatments, the instructions prior to round 11 described in 
detail what messages could be sent, including the option to send “no response,” but 
provided no guidance about why any particular message should be sent. We stressed 
that the messages are cheap talk.
Subjects in the two chat treatments received extensive instructions, largely focused 
on the mechanics of using the chat program. The instructions gave the subjects no 
guidance on what types of messages should be sent other than (i) requesting that 
they not identify themselves and (ii) asking them to avoid offensive language. These 
instructions also stressed that the messages are cheap talk with no direct effect on 
payoffs.
Subjects had printed copies of the payoff tables for both periods available when-
ever they made a decision. When choosing a price for either period, the interface 
showed subjects any messages or chat from either player for the current period as 
well as a summary of outcomes (prices and payoffs) for all previous rounds. The 
interface automatically showed the summary for the three most recent rounds with a 
scroll bar that could be used to see earlier rounds. When choosing a price in Period 2, 
subjects could see the prices and payoffs for both players in Period 1, but could not 
see any communication from Period 1. At the end of each period subjects received 
a summary of the prices chosen by both players as well as both players’ payoffs for 
the period. Period 2 feedback also included the sum of payoffs across both periods 
for both players.
The interface (with one exception) did not include identifying information about 
a subjects’ opponent to limit the possibility of repeated game effects across rounds. 
To make it possible for subjects to tell whether a message had been sent by them-
selves or their opponent, messages in the chat window were tagged with a randomly 
generated ten digit “chat id.” At the time these sessions were run, we were unable to 
generate new chat ids across rounds or to use nonidentifying tags. Subjects were not 
allowed to have any writing implements during the experiment to prevent them from 
writing down the other players’ chat ids, and it seems unlikely that they remembered 
long random numbers across multiple rounds. With one exception, the content of the 
chat contains no evidence that subjects knew when they had played an opponent pre-
viously.10 In follow-up experiments at FSU we have run sessions with both a “chat 
id” and nonidentifiable tags (“mine” and “other”). The type of tag has no discernible 
effect on messages or behavior.
Sessions were automatically ended at the two hour mark to avoid subject fatigue 
(this was not announced to subjects in advance). Due to this rule, one session of the 
rChat treatment only had 16 rounds and another only had 18 rounds.
10 One subject in the rChat treatment tried to pass on the identity of a subject who had cheated him to two other 
subjects (he didn’t exactly remember the chat ID of the offending party, but came close). None of our conclusions 
change if the affected observations are dropped.
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III. Results
Collusion in the TPBG is defined in terms of Period 1 play. Any discussion of 
collusion in the results section refers to Period 1 choices. Our analysis of Period 2 
choices focuses on how these depend on Period 1 outcomes, a central point of inter-
est for understanding the relationship between communication and collusion. See 
online Appendix D for tables and figures giving frequencies of all actions in both 
periods for all rounds, broken down by treatment.
A. Behavior in rounds 1–10
Initially modest levels of collusion collapse over ten rounds without communica-
tion. In Round 1, 44 percent of the subjects choose Low in Period 1 compared with 
only 12 percent choosing High. By Round 10, play converges to the Nash equilib-
rium for the Period 1 game with 86 percent of subjects choosing Low for Period 1 
and only 4 percent choosing High. There is no statistically significant difference 
between treatments for the first ten rounds. Underlying the collapse of collusion in 
Rounds 1–10 are poor incentives to collude. In Round 1 the average payoffs for the 
entire round (i.e., the sum of payoffs for Periods 1 and 2) following Period 1 choices 
of High, Medium, and Low are 34, 82, and 98 ECUs respectively. Subjects earn 
almost three times as much if Low is chosen in Period 1 rather than High. Similarly 
bad incentives exist throughout Rounds 1–10.
Period 2 choices are more diffuse than Period 1 choices, but by Round 10 a clear 
mode has emerged at Medium with 53 percent of all Period 2 choices. Period 2 
choices are positively and significantly correlated with Period 1 choices. This effect 
strengthens over time, but is never sufficiently large to prevent Low from being 
the profit maximizing choice for Period 1. The dependence of Period 2 behavior 
on Period 1 outcomes suggests that the type (but not the magnitude) of contin-
gent behavior needed for tacit collusion is present in the data before communication 
becomes available.
B. Prices in rounds 11–20
Figure 1 plots the frequency of High being played in Period 1 across Rounds 10–20 
for each treatment. Prior to the introduction of communication in Round 11, play of 
high is infrequent in all five treatments and has largely vanished by Round 10. For 
the N treatment, there is no discernible restart as play continues the pattern from 
Rounds 1–10 with steady movement toward 100 percent play of Low in Period 1. In 
contrast, all four communication treatments show a large initial increase in collusion 
as choice of High rises in Round 11 when communication becomes available. After 
this initial burst the evolution of play through Rounds 11–20 strongly differs across 
the four communication treatments.
In the two limited message space treatments, P1 and P1C, an initial increase in 
collusion is followed by a steady collapse. The P1 treatment shows the least initial 
increase in collusion of the communication treatments. Medium rather than High is 
the modal choice in Round 11. Use of High dies out over time, almost  disappearing 
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by round 20, and use of Medium drops steadily as well. Play converges toward 
the noncooperative outcome. The P1C treatment does little better, in spite of the 
availability of contingent messages. The initial increase in use of High is somewhat 
stronger than in P1, with High being the clear modal strategy in Round 11, but a 
similar collapse follows. Period 1 play has not converged by Round 20, but with 
choice of High having become quite rare (12 percent) and a mode of choosing Low 
(51 percent) having emerged, it is clear where things are headed.
The initial spike in play of High is much stronger in both chat treatments than 
in either limited message space treatment. In Round 11, the modal Period 1 choice 
is High for both PChat and rChat with play of Low being almost nonexistent 
(5 percent in both treatments). The subsequent dynamics differ between the two 
chat treatments. In the PChat treatment use of High falls sharply until Round 17, 
similar to the declines observed in the P1 and P1C treatments. Unlike the limited 
message space treatments this decline reverses in Rounds 17–20. Round 20 choices 
are largely indistinguishable from those made for Round 11 with 72 percent of the 
subjects choosing High. There is a clear trend towards collusion in the long run.
In the rChat treatment, no decline in collusion is observed. The distribution of 
Period 1 actions is essentially constant over Rounds 11–20. The small shifts upward 
in Rounds 17 and 19 are artifacts driven by rChat sessions ending in different rounds. 
If we break the data down by session, little change is observed over Rounds 11–20.
Table 2 reports the results of regressions providing statistical evidence of treat-
ment effects in Rounds 11–20. These are ordered probit models based on all obser-
vations from Rounds 11–20. The standard errors are corrected for clustering at the 




















N treatment P1 treatment P1C treatment PChat treatment RChat treatment 
Figure 1. Play of High in Period 1
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coded as 2, Medium coded as 1, and Low coded as 0. The independent variables are 
treatment dummies, with the N treatment as the base. The right panel reformulates 
this regression to measure differences between treatments. In all cases, the  treatment 
effect and differences between treatments are significant at the 1 percent level. 
Online Appendix A reports a more sophisticated version of this analysis. Controls 
are included for behavior in Rounds 1–10, and data is broken down into two round 
chunks so that time trends can be discussed. We find that the differences between 
treatments are statistically significant for (almost) all of the two round chunks. We 
also examine changes within treatments over time, confirming that Period 1 prices 
decline and then rebound significantly in the PChat treatment. The dip and recovery 
in the PChat treatment are unlikely to have occurred by chance.
C. Content Analysis
The results of the P1 and P1C treatments show that the possibility of communi-
cating intent to collude, even if backed with the possibility of sending Period 2 mes-
sages contingent on Period 1 outcomes, is insufficient to generate stable collusion. 
Something contained in the rich exchanges of the chat treatments must lead to high 
rates of collusion. To systematically study how the content of chat affects play we 
quantified content by coding all of the dialogues. The goal was to be as comprehen-
sive as possible, including a category for any type of message that might conceiv-
ably be relevant for play of the game, rather than only coding categories we thought 
likely, ex ante, to be important in generating collusion. See online Appendix B for a 
full list of categories.
Two research assistants independently coded all messages. No effort was made to 
force agreement among coders and the coders were not informed about any hypoth-
eses to be tested. Coding was binary with a message coded as a 1 if it was deemed 
to contain the relevant category of content and zero otherwise. We had no require-
ment on the number of codes for a message—a coder could check as many or few 
categories as he deemed appropriate.
Table 3 summarizes the frequency of the most common categories, defined as 
any category that was coded in at least 5 percent of the dialogues (averaging across 
coders). The measure of frequency reported in Table 3 is the percentage of dialogues 
Table 2—Ordered Probit Models for Treatment Effects
Comparison with no communication Differences between treatments
Variable Estimate Standard error Variable Estimate Standard error
P1 1.314*** 0.191 P1 − N 1.314*** 0.191
P1C 1.707*** 0.193 P1C − P1 0.393*** 0.119
PChat 2.651*** 0.200 PChat − P1C 0.944*** 0.122
RChat 3.250*** 0.211 RChat − PChat 0.599*** 0.140
Pseudo r2 0.276 r2 0.276
Note: Standard errors have been corrected for clustering at the individual level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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where the category was coded. For messages prior to Period 2 from the rChat treat-
ment, observations are broken down by whether both players colluded in Period 1 
(both choose High) or one player cheated (deviated from an agreement to choose 
High). Observations where both players cheated are not included. The final column 
of each panel shows κ, a common measure of inter-coder agreement (Cohen 1960). 
The κ’s generally show substantial agreement between the coders, especially since 
the number of possible codes was large and no attempt was made to force agreement 
between coders.
Subjects almost always engaged in communication relevant to the game. Period 
1 prices were proposed in 618 of 622 dialogues, and only one dialogue lacked sub-
stantive discussion of how the game would be played. The content of the dialogues 
differed substantially between the PChat and rChat treatments, and there was gen-
erally more substantive conversation prior to Period 1 in the PChat treatment. Since 
subjects both behave differently in the two chat treatments and communicate dif-
ferently, we do not pool data from the two chat treatments in the content analysis.
Agreements and Cheating.—In all four communication treatments, we can iden-
tify agreements between the players on what price to set in Period 1. For the P1 
and P1C treatments, we define the players as having come to an agreement if their 
 messages prior to Period 1 suggest the same Period 1 prices. In the PChat and rChat 
Table 3






Period 1 proposal: both play Medium 21.1 8.1 0.802
Period 1 proposal: both play High 88.9 97.5 0.812
Period 2 proposal: both play High 93.6 54.1 0.847
Disagreement with most recent proposal 10.9 4.0 0.343
Agreement with most recent proposal 79.4 79.1 0.840
Implicit threat to punish cheating in Period 2 5.8 6.5 0.532
Explicit threat to punish cheating with Low in Period 2 14.1 1.7 0.755
Agreement with proposed punishment (all punishments) 10.8 2.3 0.451
Request for proposals 7.7 11.8 0.721
Appeal to mutual benefits 29.7 15.7 0.587
Reference to safety or risk of strategies 7.5 2.5 0.397
Specific reference to payoff table 16.9 9.6 0.694
Promises of trustworthy behavior 11.1 8.6 0.624
Expression of distrust 11.1 3.6 0.448
Appeal for trustworthy behavior 15.3 6.8 0.460
Self-report having been cheated in earlier rounds 16.9 10.8 0.812





Period 1, cheated κ
Positive feedback following cooperation 28.3 2.3 0.731
Apology for cheating — 47.7 0.778
Rationalizing cheating — 44.7 0.671
Admonition for cheating/lying — 56.8 0.623
Period 2 proposal: both play High 90.1 89.4 0.792
Agreement with most recent proposal 67.5 39.4 0.473
Appeal to mutual benefits 1.7 26.5 0.366
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treatments, the players are defined as having an agreement if a proposal for Period 1 
prices is made by one player and then accepted by the other.
The left panel of Figure 2 shows the percentage of pairs agreeing to play High in 
Period 1, broken down by round and treatment. Pairs almost always reach an agree-
ment on Period 1 prices in the PChat (98 percent reach agreement) and rChat treat-
ments (100 percent reach agreement), but often do not reach agreements in the P1 
(51 percent reach agreement) and P1C treatments (55 percent reach agreements). 
It is relatively hard to reach an agreement in the limited message space treatments 
since subjects cannot revise proposals when their initial proposals do not agree. 
Subject to reaching an agreement, players in all treatments with communication 
overwhelmingly agree on choosing High in Period 1 (92 percent in P1, 97 percent 
in P1C, 85 percent in PChat, and 94 percent in rChat).
We define cheating as choosing Low or Medium in Period 1 following an agree-
ment to choose High in Period 1. The right panel of Figure 2 shows the frequency 
of cheating broken down by round and treatment. The probability of cheating in the 
P1 and P1C treatments is substantial even in early rounds and rises over time. The 
high frequency of cheating indicates that the cause of declining collusion in the P1 
and P1C treatments is not a failure to reach agreements on play of High in Period 1. 
Even if all pairs reached collusive agreements, it is unlikely that collusion could 
survive such pervasive cheating.
For the chat treatments, cheating follows a matching pattern to that observed for 
play of High in Figure 1. Cheating in the PChat treatment is initially only slightly 
higher than in the rChat treatment, but rises steadily to a peak in Round 17. It then 
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Figure 2. Agreements and Cheating
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The standard theory of collusion suggests that the decision to cheat on an agree-
ment to collude is driven by whether cheating is likely to be punished. Can we then 
explain the low levels of cheating in the two chat treatments by relatively high likeli-
hood of punishment?
Define unilateral cheating as the case where one player cheats on an agreement 
to choose High in Period 1 while the other player does not. Unilateral cheating is 
frequently punished in Rounds 11–20 of all four treatments with communication. 
Punishment for unilateral cheating is relatively strong in the two treatments with 
limited message spaces. In the P1 treatment, the proportion of noncheaters (subjects 
who do not cheat on an agreement to choose High) choosing High in Period 2 drops 
from 90 percent when no cheating occurs to 9 percent when the opponent cheats. In 
the P1C treatment this proportion goes from 99 percent to 33 percent. Punishment is 
weaker in the two chat treatments. The proportion of noncheaters that choose High 
in Period 2 changes from 97 percent to 45 percent when their opponent cheats in the 
PChat and from to 100 percent and 65 percent in the rChat treatment. Punishment 
of cheating is significantly weaker in the rChat treatment than in the PChat treat-
ment, consistent with the theory of renegotiation, and the difference between treat-
ments grows over time.11 Differing frequencies of punishment do not explain the 
relatively low levels of cheating in the two chat treatments or the low level of cheat-
ing in the rChat treatment relative to the PChat treatment.
Of course, the frequency of punishment is not the only factor determining incen-
tives to cheat, as the payoff from cheating depend both on whether unilateral cheat-
ing will be punished and the likelihood that the other player will cheat. There are 
strong incentives to cheat in P1 and P1C because of frequent cheating by others. 
This becomes obvious when comparing total payoffs for the round (summing over 
both periods) when a subject cheats on a collusive agreement with the total payoffs 
when he does not cheat. In the P1 and P1C treatments, the average increases in total 
payoff from cheating are 19 and 26 ECUs respectively in Rounds 11–12, increasing 
to 36 and 43 ECUs for Rounds 19–20. As a point of comparison, a subject gains 54 
ECUs by cheating on a collusive agreement if the other player does not cheat and 
Period 2 actions are unaffected.
The incentives to cheat in the PChat treatment are initially large, primarily 
because of the relatively low threat of punishment. The average increase in total 
payoff from cheating on an agreement is 31 ECUs in Rounds 11–12. Over time the 
incentive to cheat shrinks to an average of 12 ECUs in Rounds 19–20. This reflects 
both an increase in punishment and a decreasing threat over Rounds 17–20 of being 
cheated. The incentives to cheat are in line with the initial decrease in collusion, but 
do not fully explain why collusion recovers in later rounds since cheating continues 
to pay (albeit, by less). The opposite trend on the incentives to cheat emerges in the 
rChat treatment. The average gain from cheating is only 10 ECUs over Rounds 
11–12, but it jumps to 35 ECUs for Rounds 15–16 (the last two rounds before the 
11 In Rounds 16–20 unilateral cheating lowers the proportion of Period 2 choices of High by noncheaters from 
98 percent to 39 percent in PChat versus a change from 100 percent to 75 percent in rChat. Punishment is signifi-
cantly more likely in PChat at the 5 percent level for Rounds 11–20 and the 1 percent level for Rounds 16–20 based 
on the results of ordered probit regressions controlling for round effects and individual effects. This is based on 99 
observations for PChat and 65 observations for rChat.
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first session ended). There is little danger of getting cheated in the rChat treatment, 
but punishment is sufficiently weak in the later rounds that compliance with a col-
lusive agreement is not incentive compatible. Nonetheless, collusion remains stable.
The analysis of cheating and punishment leaves us with a pair of puzzling obser-
vations. In neither chat treatment are the average gains from cheating negative at any 
point, yet both treatments show high levels of collusion. Likewise, the incentives to 
cheat are stronger in the long run for the rChat treatment than the PChat treatment, 
yet this is the treatment with the highest and most stable levels of collusion. These 
observations only make sense if something in the message content counteracts the 
generally poor incentives to honor collusive agreements. We therefore turn to the 
effects of specific types of messages.
Threats and Promises.—An agreement to play High is only credible if accom-
panied by a threat that failure to cooperate in Period 1 will be punished by play of 
Low. Our coding scheme distinguishes between two different types of threats to 
punish cheating, explicit and implicit. An explicit threat of punishment refers to 
cases where subjects specifically state that failure to collude will lead to use of Low 
rather than High in Period 2. An implicit threat of punishment refers to cases where 
a subject threatened to punish noncollusion but did not specify what strategy would 
be used in Period 2. The top panel of Figure 3 shows the frequency of explicit and 
implicit threats (averaged across the two coders) in the two chat treatments.
The use of threats rises over time in both treatments. The frequency of threats is 
always higher in the PChat treatment than in the rChat treatment, and most threats 
are explicit in the PChat treatment while most threats in the rChat treatment are 
implicit.12
The theories of collusion and cheap talk make threats of punishment a natural 
focus for our analysis of chat content, but the psychology and economics litera-
tures both suggest that promises could play an important role in increasing coop-
eration (Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland 1994; Charness and Dufwenberg 2006). 
Communication can also reinforce group identity and norms of maximizing joint 
benefits (Dawes, Van De Kragt, and Orbell 1988), providing yet another possible 
explanation for decreased cheating in the last few rounds of the PChat treatment.
Three common coding categories relate to these alternative explanations for the 
positive effect of chat: promises of trustworthy behavior,13 appeals for trustworthy 
behavior by the other player, and appeals to the mutual benefits of collusion. The bot-
tom panel of Figure 3 shows the percentage of dialogues (averaged across coders) in 
the PChat and rChat treatment where these three categories were observed. In both 
treatments, appeals to the mutual benefits of collusion are consistently more com-
mon than either promises of trustworthy behavior, appeals for trustworthy behavior, 
12 The difference in frequency of threats (explicit or implicit) between the PChat and rChat treatments is sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level in Rounds 16–20. For explicit threats, the difference is significant at the 10 percent 
level for Rounds 11–15 and at the 1 percent level for Rounds 16–20. These statements are based on ordered probits 
with round dummies (not interacted with the treatment dummy) as controls and standard errors corrected for clus-
tering at the subject level.
13 This category also includes messages where subjects indicate that they should be trusted (e.g., “uve just gotta 
trust me” and “well, just trust me”).
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or explicit threats. In the PChat treatment, coding of requests for and promises of 
trustworthy behavior become more common over time, but these categories remain 
rare throughout the rChat treatments. Appeals to the mutual benefits of collusion 
also drop off sharply over time in the rChat treatment.
It is nontrivial to sort out the effects of the different message categories. A naïve 
approach is to compare the level of cheating in observations where a message cat-
egory is coded with the frequency of cheating when the category is not coded. In 
the PChat treatment, for example, the likelihood of cheating is lower when either 
an explicit threat is observed (10 percent with versus 35 percent without) or, to a 
lesser extent, an appeal to the mutual benefits of collusion (25 percent with ver-
sus 34 percent without). Unfortunately, these observations do not necessarily cap-
ture a causal relationship between the categories in question and cheating. At the 
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Figure 3. Frequency of Chat Categories over Time
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 message in  question. Causal statements only make sense in the latter case. Even 
after  accounting for this, a major problem remains because most dialogues include 
many codes, including codes that we have not thus far discussed. Since the coding of 
categories is often correlated, comparisons of cheating with and without a category 
being coded may reflect a failure to control for the effects of other types of mes-
sages. To address these issues we turn to regression analysis.
Table 4 reports the results for regressions in which the dependent variable is a 
dummy for whether the subject cheated on an agreement. Observations where an 
agreement was not reached (1 percent of the dataset) are dropped. Cheating is a 
binary variable, so the regressions use a probit specification. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the subject level. We report both param-
eter estimates (before the slash) and marginal effects (after the slash) for each 
variable.
The independent variables of primary interest measure whether a comment from 
a specific category was received or sent by the individual in the dialogue prior to 
Period 1. These variables are averages across the two coders and therefore have 
three possible values: 0,  1 _ 2 , and 1. With a few exceptions, the regressions incorpo-
rate all categories that were coded in at least 5 percent of dialogues.14 As additional 
controls, the regressions include dummies for the agreed upon price, the current 
round, the subject’s average Period 1 price in Rounds 1–10, and the average Period 1 
price of their opponent in Rounds 1–10. The subject’s own history of cooperation 
in Rounds 1–10 provides a control for unobserved individual effects beyond the 
correction for clustering. The inclusion of the opponent’s history of cooperation 
in Rounds 1–10 controls for a potential source of omitted variable bias. The oppo-
nent’s history cannot have a direct effect on decisions to cheat, since subjects do not 
know their opponent’s history, but individuals who are inherently more cooperative 
may also communicate in subtly different ways not captured by the coding.
Omitted variable bias can also arise due to the interactive nature of dialogues. 
There is correlation between the types of messages that are sent and the types that 
are received. This can make it appear that receipt of a message causes cooperative 
action, when the effect is actually driven by a related message the subject sent. 
Including controls for sent messages eliminates this bias as the impact of sent mes-
sages is directly accounted for. As it turns out, none of our conclusions about the 
effects of receiving messages change with controls for sent messages.
The parameter estimates for the sent messages should be interpreted as identify-
ing associations rather than causal relationships with cheating. Because a strategy 
for sending messages and choosing prices could be jointly determined prior to the 
beginning of a round, it is impossible to identify a causal relationship between them.
The regression was run separately on the PChat and rChat data. The parameter 
estimates for the agreement dummies, round dummies, and controls for Period 1 
prices in Rounds 1–10 are not of direct interest and are not reported in Table 4 
to save space. Looking at the effect of received messages in the PChat data, only 
14 Because we include dummies for the agreed upon price as independent variables, we do not include the mes-
sages proposing prices to avoid colinearity. Likewise, the category for agreeing to a punishment scheme is highly 
correlated with sending a threat, and is excluded to avoid colinearity.
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explicit threats have a significant effect on the likelihood of cheating. The marginal 
effect is large, with an estimated 26 percent reduction in the probability of cheating. 
Receiving an appeal to the mutual benefits of collusion, a promise of trustworthy 
behavior, or an appeal for trustworthy behavior all fail to have a significant effect 
Table 4—Probit Regressions on Effect of Chat Categories
PChat rChat

























































































































log likelihood −325.26 −221.58
Pseudo r2 0.125 0.070
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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on the likelihood of cheating. The PChat regression shows that explicit threats are 
by far the type of message whose receipt has the strongest effect on collusion in 
Period 1. In the Appendix we explore a wide variety of alternative specifications and 
find that this result is quite robust.
Turning to sent messages, subjects who send explicit threats cheat significantly 
less. The marginal effect is large, with an estimated 40 percent reduction in cheat-
ing. Subjects who promise to be trustworthy are also significantly less likely to cheat 
on an agreement. The marginal effect is large at 19 percent, but less than half of the 
marginal effect of sending an explicit threat.
The rChat regression shows that Period 1 communication has a somewhat dif-
ferent impact in the rChat treatment than in the PChat Treatment. Receiving an 
implicit threat significantly reduces cheating, while receiving an explicit threat has 
no significant effect. The estimated marginal effect from receiving an implicit threat 
in the rChat treatment is about the same as the marginal effect of an explicit threat 
in the PChat treatment (25 percent versus 26 percent). Receiving an expression of 
distrust significantly increases cheating. This makes sense, but should be interpreted 
cautiously given the rarity of such comments.
Sending either an implicit or explicit threat has a significant negative effect on 
cheating. Sending a promise of trustworthy behavior once again has a strong nega-
tive effect on cheating. There is a positive effect on cheating from sending a message 
referring to the safety or risk of strategies, but this is only weakly significant.
Threats do not explain the initial jump in collusion for the PChat treatment. 
When a subject receives an explicit threat in Rounds 11–12 of the PChat treatment 
(the first two rounds with communication), the subject never cheats on a collusive 
agreement. This sounds impressive, but there are only four such observations. The 
importance of threats emerges over time as this type of comment becomes more fre-
quent, providing an explanation for why collusion returns to its initial levels rather 
than collapsing as in P1 and P1C. Similar comments apply to the rChat treatment. 
Implicit threats have the expected effect on cheating in Rounds 11–12, but are too 
rare to explain the initial high levels of collusion.
Econometric analysis like that reported in Table 4 fails to find a relationship 
between either appeals to mutual benefits or promises of trustworthy behavior and 
cheating in Rounds 11–12 of the PChat treatment. Reaching an agreement to col-
lude has a significant effect on whether collusion occurs. As can be seen in Figure 2, 
such agreements are more common in Rounds 11–12 of PChat as compared to P1C. 
This provides a partial explanation for by the higher frequency of collusion in early 
rounds.
Chat and the Incentives to Cheat.—We now can resolve the puzzles that sub-
jects in the chat treatments cheat less than expected given the weak incentives to 
collude and that collusion rebounds in the last periods of the PChat treatment. The 
key insight is that what matters to subjects is not the average incentive to cheat, 
but instead the incentive to cheat given the specific messages they have sent and 
received.
For each case where we found a statistically significant reduction of cheating 
from sending and/or receiving a type of message, Figure 4 displays the relationship 
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between sending and/or receiving this type of message and the incentives to cheat. 
A message is categorized as including a category if this was coded by either coder. 
Data is only included from observations where the subjects agreed to play High in 
Period 1. The average total payoffs for the entire round are plotted conditional on 
whether or not the player cheated on the agreement. Hollow bars indicate cells with 
less than five observations. Two cells had no observations and therefore are missing. 
As a point of comparison we also plot the corresponding average total payoff for all 
observations with agreements to play High in Period 1.
Types of communication that reduce cheating generally reduce the incentives to 
cheat. The cumulative effect of messages associated with significantly lower cheat-
ing on the incentives to cheat is large. In the PChat treatment, subjects who receive 
an explicit threat, send an explicit threat, or send a promise to not cheat significantly 
lower their average payoff by cheating on a collusive agreement (Δ = −27.7 ECUs, 
t = 2.27, p < 0.05) compared to a significant average gain from cheating otherwise 
(Δ = 23.5 ECUs, t = 3.18, p < 0.01). In line with these incentives, there is only a 
14 percent chance of cheating by subjects who receive an explicit threat, send an 
explicit threat, or send a promise as compared with 36 percent otherwise. Over time 
the likelihood of effective messages strongly increases, creating the conditions for 
a return to collusion.
We cannot say much about what happens following cheating in the rChat treat-
ment due to a paucity of observations. Subjects who do not receive an explicit threat, 
send an implicit or explicit threat, or send a promise of trustworthy behavior sig-
nificantly increase their payoffs by cheating (Δ = 19.0 ECUs, t = 2.94, p < 0.01). 
There is no significant effect from cheating for subjects who do receive or send such 
messages, but this says little since there are only three observations with cheating 
in this subset.
P1C versus PChat.— In the PChat treatment, explicit threats play a central role 
in fostering collusion. Threats to punish cheating with Period 2 play of Low are 
also available in the P1C treatment, yet collusion shows no sign of recovering over 
time in this treatment. The reason is not obvious. It should be easier for subjects to 
learn to use threats of punishment in the P1C treatment, since the design suggests 
the possibility of contingent strategies to the subjects and there are no other types 
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Figure 4. Gains from Cheating and Chat
VoL. 6 No. 2 271cooper and kÜhn: communication, renegotiation, and collusion
from a collusive agreement are more common in the P1C treatment (24 percent of 
pairs) than in the PChat treatment (18 percent of pairs). The cause of lower collu-
sion in P1C also does not seem to be that the single round of communication makes 
it more difficult to come to an agreement than in PChat. In follow up experiments 
where subjects could take multiple sequential turns sending messages, agreement 
rates were much higher than in the original P1C treatment but collusion was no 
more frequent (Cooper and Kühn 2013). The difference between the P1C and PChat 
treatments could be purely an effect of the differing mediums of communication 
(see Brosig, Ockenfels, and Weimann 2003), but the specifics of communication in 
the two treatments suggest otherwise.
The P1C and PChat treatments differ in the types of explicit punishments pro-
posed. In the PChat treatment, all messages coded as explicit threats call for play 
of Low in Period 2 if the other player cheats. Subjects never threaten to punish 
cheating with play of Medium. In contrast, 90 percent of explicit threats in the P1C 
treatment call for cheating to be punished with play of Medium in Period 2. Subjects 
in the P1C treatment therefore almost never use threats which would make col-
lusion incentive compatible. For subjects who receive an explicit threat, the aver-
age loss from cheating on an agreement is negligible (0.3 ECUs). Not surprisingly 
given these weak incentives, receiving an explicit threat makes subjects in the P1C 
treatment no more likely to abide by a collusive agreement: 65 percent of subjects 
receiving explicit threats cheat on collusive agreements versus 56 percent for all 
others. Unlike the PChat treatment, explicit threats are ineffective in the P1C treat-
ment, subjects abandon their use, and collusion vanishes over time.
Communication is fundamentally different when subjects participate in a natural 
conversation rather than using a limited message space. This is not just because 
more types of messages are available and these can be combined and sequenced in 
more ways. Our subjects use the available messages less effectively with a limited 
message space than when messages are embedded within the natural environment 
of a conversation.
The Effect of renegotiation.—Effective messages prior to Period 1 improve the 
local incentives to collude, but these improved incentives do not provide a satisfac-
tory explanation for consistently high collusion in the rChat treatment. Effective 
messages are uncommon until the later rounds but collusion is high and stable 
throughout. Moreover, cheating is rare (16 percent) even when effective messages 
are not present. It is also puzzling that implicit threats are effective in the rChat 
treatment given that they are not in the PChat treatment and the theory of cheap talk 
gives no reason why nonspecific threats should be useful.
The obvious difference between the PChat and rChat treatments is the addition 
of a communication phase between the Period 1 and 2 decisions. Consistent with the 
theory of renegotiation, attempts at renegotiation following unilateral cheating are 
frequent and reasonably successful. For games with unilateral cheating on collusive 
agreements, mutual play of High in Period 2 is suggested by at least one of the sub-
jects in 89 percent of the Period 2 dialogues. When such suggestions occur, 64 per-
cent of the pairs successfully coordinate on mutual play of High in Period 2. This 
compares to 14 percent of pairs coordinating on mutual play of High in Period 2 for 
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the (admittedly infrequent) cases where play of High is not suggested. Successful 
renegotiation causes the financial consequences of cheating to be weak in the rChat 
treatment, creating strong incentives to cheat in Period 1
A critical point missing from the theory of renegotiation is that communication 
after a deviation allows cheated subjects to engage in verbal punishments. Negative 
verbal responses to cheating are quite common in our data. In cases of unilateral 
cheating on a collusive agreement, 73 percent of the subjects who were cheated 
admonished the other player for cheating and/or lying. The messages were often 
quite harsh (and ignored the instructions to avoid cursing). Examples include “good 
job, [expletive deleted],” “you are a bad person … i hope someone [expletive deleted] 
you over as well,” and (our favorite) “you know, they shoot you for that in Texas.” 
Messages of this type are best interpreted as nonpecuniary punishments in the spirit 
of Masclet et al. (2003). Verbal punishment provides a cheap way to punish cheat-
ing.15 If subjects dislike being told off, we would expect less cheating than when 
only conventional punishment (choosing Low in Period 2) is possible.
While the subjects who admonish cheating presumably believe they are punish-
ing the recipients, the recipients may not care. There is a sharp difference in behav-
ior between those subjects who never received an admonishment and those who ever 
received an admonishment. For convenience, we label these groups as “noncheat-
ers” and “cheaters.” Most of the subjects (56/76) are noncheaters. Noncheaters only 
cheat on 2 percent of collusive agreements and frequently use verbal punishment, 
admonishing cheating/lying in 80 percent of observations where they followed a 
collusive agreement and their opponent cheated. We cannot provide direct evidence 
that noncheaters dislike receiving verbal punishment since they do not discuss the 
matter and, by definition, never receive verbal punishment. However, their own fre-
quent use of verbal punishment suggests they think receiving verbal punishment is 
bad. The effectiveness of implicit threats, which may be seen as threats of nonpecu-
niary punishment, and the low usage of explicit threats can also be seen as indirect 
evidence that receiving verbal punishments is considered bad.
Cheaters, in contrast, cheat on 49 percent of collusive agreements, with the prob-
ability of cheating remaining stable over time. In 80 percent of the observations in 
which cheaters cheat, they are admonished. If they disliked getting admonished, we 
would expect them to cheat less following an admonishment. Instead, the rate of 
cheating by cheaters who have previously been admonished rises slightly to 52 per-
cent. When cheaters do not cheat but get cheated by their opponents, they are far less 
likely to admonish (42 percent) than noncheaters.
Our population thus appears to consist of two types with relatively stable (if very 
different) behavior. Stable cooperation occurs in the rChat treatment because the 
vast majority of our subjects were noncheaters who use verbal punishment and pre-
sumably fear receiving it. We can make an educated guess that noncheaters do not 
cheat, in spite of poor monetary incentives, to avoid verbal punishment. Cheaters 
15 Verbal punishment is often combined with conventional punishment. Subjects who were cheated and sent a 
verbal punishment were also more likely to engage in conventional punishment: 42 percent of subjects who were 
cheated and admonished their opponents chose a price other than High, compared with only 22 percent of subjects 
who were cheated and did not admonish their opponent.
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do not seem to be inhibited by verbal punishment, but there are too few of them to 
destabilize the social norm of cooperation
IV. Conclusions
The primary purpose of our experiment was to study how communication facili-
tates the development of stable collusion. Our results indicate that allowing subjects 
to communicate an intent to collude is insufficient to generate persistent collusion 
even if subjects can send contingent messages calling for punishment of cheating, 
but allowing a rich message space leads to persistent collusion. As suggested by 
theory, the use of explicit threats to punish deviation from collusive agreements 
is the most effective type of message for promoting collusion when only pregame 
communication is allowed. Collusion is also promoted by sending a message prom-
ising trustworthy behavior. In sessions where renegotiation is allowed, high levels 
of collusion occur contrary to standard theories of renegotiation. While attempts 
at renegotiation occur and are reasonably successful, as predicted by theory, the 
effect of renegotiation is reversed by the impact of verbal punishment of cheating 
which provides an inexpensive and easily understood means of supporting collu-
sion. Preplay use of implicit threats is quite effective in the renegotiation treatment, 
presumably because implicit threats raise the specter that cheating will be met by 
verbal punishment.
In our experiments, monetary incentives combine with behavioral factors to 
explain collusive behavior. In the PChat treatment, explicit threats cannot explain 
the initial increase in collusion (indeed no type of message beyond agreements to 
collude explains the high rates of collusion in early rounds), but play a central role 
in the persistence of collusion. Sending promises of trustworthy behavior leads to 
reduced cheating, in line with the results of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). A 
plausible explanation for this result is that subjects either would feel guilty about 
breaking a promise or letting down their opponent (lie aversion and guilt aversion 
to use current jargon). However, as can be seen in Figure 4, lying about trustworthy 
behavior is financially punished in the PChat treatment (in the very small number 
of observations where it occurs). Leaving aside subtle psychological factors like 
guilt aversion, subjects may have a straightforward pecuniary reason not to renege 
on promises. Neither receiving a promise of trustworthy behavior nor an appeal to 
mutual payoffs has a significant effect on the likelihood of cheating. We therefore 
have little direct evidence that communication is successfully building trust between 
opponents or reducing social distance.
The most surprising result of our paper is that renegotiation facilitates collusion 
even though the basic logic of renegotiation theory finds support in the data. A natu-
ral question to ask is whether a result that relies so heavily on emotional reactions 
from subjects extends to other settings, particularly decisions made in a corporate 
setting. We suspect that this depends on several factors. First, our result depends 
on the frequency of two distinct types in our population, noncheaters and cheaters. 
There is no reason to assume, ex ante, that the mix of types is fixed across popula-
tions and is especially likely to vary in corporate settings where strong selection 
processes are in play. Thus, although we expect the same basic forces and types of 
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individuals to be present in most populations, they need not balance in such a way 
that cooperation is higher with renegotiation. Second, differences between settings 
can occur due to the differing social context. As an example, most people would 
agree that lying is immoral, but do not feel that this rule applies when they are 
playing poker. If subjects perceive corporate settings as calling for a different set of 
social norms than an abstract laboratory setting, they may not view cheating on a 
verbal agreement as unethical behavior that merits an angry response. This would 
obviously affect our results. Finally, almost all business decisions are made in a 
group context and within an organizational hierarchy. Individuals in these settings 
may feel more responsible to other people within their corporation than to a person 
in another firm and hence be less sensitive to being admonished for cheating.
More generally, caution is always needed when generalizing results with a spe-
cific population and specific stimuli (payoffs, experimental materials, physical loca-
tion, etc.). Additional research is needed examining how much our results change as 
the experimental environment and population change. This is a major component of 
our ongoing research.
Our paper raises methodological issues concerning the study of communica-
tion in games. Studying communication with a limited message space is appealing 
because of the tight control and ease of analysis it provides, but our results point to 
problems with this methodology. One concern is that a limited message space may 
inadvertently exclude critical types of messages. Illustrating this point, we ran a fol-
low-up experiment that modified the P1C treatment to allow for renegotiation: each 
player is allowed to send a message about their intended action for Period 2 after 
the outcome for Period 1 has been observed. This has little effect, neither increasing 
nor decreasing collusion relative to P1C. Even stronger, Andersson and Wengström 
(2010) find lower cooperation with renegotiation in a similar experiment with lim-
ited message spaces. These results obviously differ from our findings in the PChat 
and rChat treatments. A plausible cause for this difference, especially in our follow-
up study where the population and games are held fixed, is the unavailability of 
verbal punishments in the limited message space experiments. Comparing the P1C 
and PChat treatments illustrates a more subtle problem—using a limited message 
space may limit subjects’ ability to effectively use a given message space. Threats 
of punishment with Low are available in both treatments but only used in PChat. 
The preceding observations suggest that using a limited message space to study how 
communication affects cooperation risks missing important features of how com-
munication functions in the more natural context of a conversation.
We view our work as a complement to field work studying the transcripts of com-
munication between colluding firms (e.g., Genesove and Mullin 2001). Field data 
on communication and collusion comes from firms that were sufficiently successful 
at colluding to warrant prosecution and sufficiently indiscrete (or possibly unlucky) 
to get caught, but in the lab we observe the full population, including firms who try 
to collude and fail. The controlled environment of the lab also allows us to manipu-
late what types of communication are available to our subjects, for example turning 
the ability to renegotiate on or off. Players in the field are presumably fairly experi-
enced at the game being played, but in the lab we get to see the learning process as 
subjects gain experience by playing the game repeatedly. Lab experiments cannot 
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match the verisimilitude of field data, but the richness of the data and the ability to 
study nonnaturally occurring communication structures make them a valuable tool 
for understanding the relationship between communication and collusion.
On a broad level our results highlight the importance of making a sharp distinc-
tion between explicit and tacit collusion in antitrust policy as suggested by Whinston 
(2006). It is possible to achieve tacit collusion in the lab, but direct communication 
makes collusion easier. More importantly, our experiments point to the types of 
communication that should be of particular concern in antitrust enforcement. Calls 
for collusion in isolation may not be terribly effective. What truly matters is laying 
out a punishment for failure to stick to a collusive agreement.
Appendix
One of the central conclusions of our paper is that the effect of explicit threats is 
far greater than any other type of message in the PChat treatment. This relies on the 
results of the PChat regression from Table 4. Table 5 reports regressions testing the 
robustness this result.
The dataset for these regressions, unless otherwise stated, is all observations from 
the PChat treatment where the subjects reached an agreement. The dependent vari-
able is a dummy for whether a player cheated on their agreement. We report param-
eter estimates, not marginal effects. Table 5 only reports the critical estimate, the 
effect of receiving an explicit threat, but full copies of the regression output are 
contained in the online appendices.
Model 1 repeats the PChat regression from Table 4. In the text we note that the 
effect of including controls for sent messages on the estimated effects of received 
messages is minimal (indicating there is little omitted variable bias). This point is 
confirmed by Model 2 which removes the controls for sent messages. The parameter 
estimate for receiving an explicit threat is slightly reduced, but remains easily signif-
icant at the 1 percent level, and the marginal effect is slightly reduced to 25 percent 
in Model 2 as opposed to 26 percent in Model 1. While not shown here, the effect 
on the other estimates for received messages is also minimal. We believe including 
the sent messages is the right choice, especially since the resulting estimates are 
interesting in their own right, but our conclusions vis-à-vis received messages are 
robust to whether or not controls for sent messages are included.
Another reason the results of Model 1 might not be robust is uncontrolled indi-
vidual effects. Model 1 includes multiple features designed to control for individual 
effects: standard errors are corrected for clustering at the individual level and con-
trols are included for the player’s behavior in Rounds 1–10 and their opponent’s 
behavior in Rounds 1–10. Going even further, we can include fixed effects in the 
regression to control for individual effects. Doing this within the framework of a 
probit is problematic because many subjects either never or always cheat, so we 
move to a linear probability model to avoid dropping large numbers of observa-
tions. Model 3 includes fixed effects for the subject making choices and Model 4 
also contains fixed effects for their opponents. In both cases the standard errors are 
corrected for clustering at the subject level, correcting for the heteroskedasticity 
associated with use of a linear probability model. Model 3 drops the control for 
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the player’s behavior in Rounds 1–10 since it is collinear with the fixed effect, and 
Model 4 drops this and the control for the opponent’s behavior in Rounds 1–10 for 
the same reason. For both Model 3 and Model 4, receiving an explicit threat signifi-
cantly reduces the likelihood of cheating. In both cases the estimated marginal effect 
of receiving an explicit threat is similar to the 26 percent estimated for Model 1. 
Adding fixed effects does not affect our primary conclusion that explicit threats are 
by far the most important type of message in determining whether players will cheat 
on a collusive agreement.
A final concern for Model 1 is that the received messages are endogenous—
to be precise, the received messages may be correlated with the error term. The 
most obvious sources of such correlation are failure to control for individual effects 
or the effect of sent messages. We hope that at this point it is apparent that these 
are unlikely to cause the estimated effect of receiving an explicit threat. However, 
it never hurts to be extra careful. The only channel through which a subject can 
affect the messages he receives is the messages he sends, since no other interaction 
between subjects occurs prior to Period 1, but a cautious reader could argue that 
messages contain nuances that our coding cannot capture so that controlling for 
commonly coded sent messages is not sufficient. It can also be argued that because 
sent messages are potentially endogenous, the estimates for received messages will 
be biased. Given that the results for Models 1 and 2 are quite similar, this is unlikely, 
but only an instrumental variables approach can adequately address concerns about 
endogeneity. Model 5 therefore presents an “all of the above” approach to establish-
ing whether there is a causal relationship between cheating and receiving explicit 
threats. This is a two-stage least squares model. As instruments for the received mes-
sages we use the messages sent by the opponent in the previous round, the messages 
received by the opponent in the previous round, and the opponent’s outcome in the 
previous round. We drop any observations where the same subjects were matched 
for the previous round, so a subject’s opponent’s actions and outcomes from the 
previous round should be uncorrelated with the subject’s current error term. All 
Round 11 observations are dropped since there are no previous round messages to 
use as instruments. To control for individual effects, fixed effects are included for a 
Table 5—Alternative Regressions on Effect of Explicit Threats in PChat
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Subject fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓
Opponent fixed effects ✓ ✓
IV ✓
Observations 626 626 626 626 525


















*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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subject and his opponent. Once again this is a linear probability model. No controls 
are included for sent messages since these are endogenous.
Model 5 once again yields the result that receiving an explicit threat has a statis-
tically significant effect on reducing cheating. While this effect is only significant 
at the 10 percent level, explicit threats are the only category of received message 
with any significant effect. We do not think that the instrumental variables approach 
taken by Model 5 is the best way to study the data. A large percentage of the data is 
discarded, a great deal of power is lost through the use of instruments, and the mag-
nitude of the parameter for explicit threats is implausible. Nonetheless, we feel that 
it is worthwhile showing that the extra step of instrumenting for received messages 
does not affect our main conclusion: there is a causal relationship between receiving 
an explicit threat and cheating on collusive agreements. 
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